National Security Policies

🗞️ 🇬🇧 Lessons from the latest « Disinformation Diplomacy » report by the UK House of Commons : ▶️Democracies must move from fragmented, defensive counter-disinformation to coordinated, strategic use of information power. 🇬🇧 National recommendations : 1. Create a National Counter-Disinformation Centre A centralised structure to coordinate response across government. • Inspired by models in Sweden, Ukraine and France • Aim: faster detection, attribution and response= a shift toward a “fusion centre” model for the information space. 2. Significantly increase funding for information defence Focus areas: FCDO Hybrid Threats Directorate & BBC World Service as key strategic asset ▶️ greater investment needed to prevent authoritarian narratives from gaining ground globally. ▶️ recognition of information power as a hard power multiplier. 3. Scale up support to allies and vulnerable regions 🔹Priority regions: Black Sea, Western Balkans, Africa 🔹Focus on strengthening independent media and civil society resilience. 4. Address legal gaps on foreign interference 🔹current threshold to prove foreign attribution deemed too high, limiting enforcement & enabling plausible deniability 🔹 urgent legislative review needed to enable faster and more effective action. 5. Introduce algorithmic transparency for platforms 🔹Amend the Online Safety Act to require: • Greater transparency on how algorithms amplify content • Stronger safeguards against coordinated manipulation 6. Invest in public resilience (media literacy and prebunking) Shift from reactive debunking to societal immunity, to strengthen public understanding & scale preventive approaches. Considering citizens as the frontline of defence. 7. Rethink strategic communications Current efforts deemed to lack compelling narratives: Need credible messengers & Content tailored to target audiences 🔹 shift from fact-based rebuttal to competitive narrative warfare. 8. Clarify and communicate strategy on China 🇨🇳 🔹Defining red lines, Influence risks, Engagement doctrine, Avoid ambiguity between economic engagement and security priorities.

Authoritarian regimes — Russia, China, Iran — have dramatically escalated hybrid warfare over the past decade. Every drone incursion, ransomware attack, and effort to manipulate information shares a unified purpose: eroding public trust in democratic institutions, dividing liberal societies, and weakening the international order. And it's working. In a new report "No Time to Lose: Liberal Democracies Can Win the Cognitive and Hybrid War Against Authoritarians" Sasha Havlicek, David Salvo, and Dr. Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven lay out why democratic governments' current response, largely reactive and fragmented across siloed ministries, is insufficient to the scale of the threat. Democracies have moved from ignoring the challenge to naming it. But naming it isn't enough. We must leverage democracies advantages to retake the strategic advantage. The authors offer three core recommendations: 👉 Establish a counter-hybrid doctrine — one that signals a genuine willingness to respond asymmetrically, develop offensive capabilities, and map adversaries' vulnerabilities, not just defend against them. 👉 Reorganize government to address hybrid threats holistically — appointing lead agencies, creating cross-domain intelligence coordination, and building informal "coalitions of the willing" outside traditional NATO/EU channels when necessary. 👉 Put strategic communications front and center — trumpeting defensive successes, making the human costs of hybrid attacks legible to citizens, and empowering trusted non-governmental voices (mayors, faith leaders, influencers) to build societal resilience. In 2026, the cognitive domain is the decisive battleground. Democracies have the tools to compete — but only if they treat this as the strategic challenge it is. Link to the full report (a quick 10 minute read) in comments and check out the briefer video below that I generated in NotebookLM. #DisinformationResearch #HybridWarfare #InformationIntegrity #FIMI #DemocraticResilience #StrategicCommunications

In my new policy paper, “Beyond Defence: A Proactive Strategy for the West in the Information Domain”, published by the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), I argue that liberal democracies must move from reactive resilience to strategic initiative in the information space. Authoritarian regimes, particularly Russia and China, have spent years refining their influence operations, exploiting our openness, and eroding public trust. Meanwhile, democratic responses remain fragmented, underfunded, and bound by processes that our adversaries see as weaknesses. In this paper, I outline how the West can reclaim the initiative through: - Strategic autonomy in the information domain, reducing dependence on US political fluctuations - Pre-bunking and proactive communication, not just fact-checking after the damage is done - Intelligence-led monitoring of disinformation ecosystems - Ethical offensive information operations that expose authoritarian corruption and hypocrisy - Empowering civil society as agile “force multipliers” on the information frontlines Read the full ICDS policy paper here: https://lnkd.in/dczv8vKz

Proud to share our new Atlantic Council report — “Authoritarian Reach and Democratic Response: A Tactical Framework to Counter and Prevent Transnational Repression,” co-authored with Sze-Fung Lee, Kenton Thibaut, Iria Puyosa, Lisandra N., Layla Mashkoor, Andy Carvin. Authoritarian regimes are extending their repression far beyond their borders, targeting journalists, activists, and diaspora communities in democracies through surveillance, threats, disinformation, and coercion. This report presents a global framework to help governments, civil society, and private actors identify, disrupt, and prevent these attacks on freedom and sovereignty. The framework offers practical tools for democratic coordination, mapping threats, strengthening legal and policy responses, and building resilience through collaboration and early-warning mechanisms. I’ve experienced first-hand how transnational repression operates in silence and shadows, from digital intimidation to physical targeting, and how democracies often respond reactively. This framework is meant to change that and defend those vulnerable to TNR, and help us get ahead of authoritarian reach. As global threats evolve, defending journalists, activists, and diaspora voices is not optional, it’s essential to defending our democratic sovereignty. 📘 Read the report here: https://lnkd.in/gTQF8jfD

#EU Unveils #Blueprint to Counter #Hybrid #Threats The European Commission and the High Representative have issued a strategic #recommendation to coordinate EU-wide action against hybrid threats. Here are the key points: New #Blueprint: Provides a comprehensive #framework for early warning, #situational #awareness, #crisis #response, and #resilience-building against hybrid campaigns. Hybrid Campaigns Defined: Coordinated, malicious efforts by state or non-state actors blending #disinformation, cyberattacks, lawfare, and economic coercion. Key Mechanisms: • Activation of a coordinated EU Hybrid Response Network • Strategic Communication Taskforce to counter foreign information manipulation • Deployment of crisis protocols across cyber, transport, energy, health, and election systems Whole-of-EU Approach: Reinforces collaboration across EU institutions, Member States, NATO, and international partners. Proactive and Resilient: Emphasizes scenario-based planning, counter-narratives, public-private cooperation, and rapid crisis coordination. Context: Rising hybrid threats amid geopolitical tensions, especially around elections, critical infrastructure, and information integrity. Bottom line: The EU is taking a firm, unified stance to defend its democratic space and societal resilience from increasingly complex hybrid attacks. Tinexta Cyber TINEXTA S.P.A. #HybridThreats #EUSecurity #StrategicCommunication #CyberResilience #Disinformation #EUBlueprint #ForeignInterference #NATO #ResiliencePolicy https://lnkd.in/dMkJMtC9

With over 2 billion voters heading to the polls in 2024, election security is more important than ever. Our latest research outlines the diversity of targets, tactics, and threats within the election cyber security landscape. In our writeup, we highlight the variety of election-related targets. This includes election systems, administrators, campaigns, and voters. The nature of cyber threat activity facing these different entities can vary dramatically. It's also vital to appreciate the variety of threat vectors at play. Many actors and operations combine cyber espionage, disruptive campaigns, and information operations. This makes it essential to not only prepare for a variety of cyber risks, but also understand how they come together. Our research outlines a variety of relevant threats including state-sponsored actors, cyber criminals, hacktivists, insider threats, and information operations as-a-service. We also discuss how state threats are far wider than just a Russia problem by highlighting actors linked to Iran, China, and North Korea that also pose a credible threat to elections (depending on the region). Ultimately, understanding the threats we are up against provides an opportunity to build a more proactive and tailored security posture to defending elections. https://lnkd.in/ebx9cZjA

𝗦̲𝗲̲𝗰̲𝘂̲𝗿̲𝗶̲𝗻̲𝗴̲ ̲𝘁̲𝗵̲𝗲̲ ̲𝗕̲𝗮̲𝗹̲𝗹̲𝗼̲𝘁̲:̲ ̲𝗧̲𝗵̲𝗲̲ ̲𝗛̲𝗶̲𝗱̲𝗱̲𝗲̲𝗻̲ ̲𝗧̲𝗵̲𝗿̲𝗲̲𝗮̲𝘁̲𝘀̲ ̲𝘁̲𝗼̲ ̲𝗢̲𝘂̲𝗿̲ ̲𝟮̲𝟬̲𝟮̲𝟰̲ ̲𝗘̲𝗹̲𝗲̲𝗰̲𝘁̲𝗶̲𝗼̲𝗻̲𝘀̲ A recent POLITICO investigation uncovered unsettling vulnerabilities in U.S. election software supply chains, exposing gaps that could compromise the integrity of our democratic process. As we approach the 2024 elections, it’s a wake-up call that we can’t afford to ignore. Key findings highlight some concerning issues: New Hampshire officials found their voter registration database vendor outsourced work overseas, potentially exposing sensitive data to foreign threats. Additionally, a security scan flagged misconfigured software connecting to Russian servers and the use of open-source code maintained by a Russian national. These vulnerabilities are stark reminders that our election infrastructure needs better safeguards. Some thoughts for policy makers: 𝗥𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗶𝗿𝗲 𝗥𝗶𝗴𝗼𝗿𝗼𝘂𝘀 𝗩𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗼𝗿 𝗩𝗲𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴: Does your third-party risk program include subcontracting provisions and onshore stipulations? Ensure that every link in your supply chain is vetted and compliant to safeguard sensitive election data. 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗽𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗦𝗕𝗢𝗠𝘀: Are your vendors providing detailed Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs)? Understanding the components and origins of your software helps prevent hidden vulnerabilities from creeping into critical systems. 𝗙𝗲𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗮𝗿𝗱𝘀: Is your election security strategy backed by federal guidelines and funding? Push for increased federal support and the establishment of uniform standards to fortify our election infrastructure against evolving threats. EI-ISAC As cybersecurity professionals, we must lead the charge in advocating for stronger election security measures. Let’s ensure that every vote cast in 2024 is secure, every voice is heard, and outcomes are trusted. Our democracy is only as strong as the systems that protect it. #ElectionSecurity #Cybersecurity #2024Election Read the full story here:

As we keep learning from recent months, hybrid threats from our adversaries don’t arrive with warning sirens or troop movements. They work quietly through narratives, misinformation, and the slow erosion of trust in democratic institutions. In my latest article for Canadian Affairs, I argue that while cyber tools and intelligence capabilities matter, Canada’s real centre of gravity and need is social and institutional resilience. Hybrid campaigns by our adversaries aim less to convince than to confuse, divide, and exhaust societies. This has direct implications for how we think about national defence. Three key takeaways: ➡️ Hybrid threats target trust, not territory. The objective isn’t persuasion, but cynicism aimed at undermining confidence in institutions, media, and one another. ➡️ Technical fixes are necessary but insufficient. Cyber defences and attribution help, but they can’t substitute for social cohesion and credible governance. ➡️ Democratic resilience is Canada’s strongest defence. Trusted local institutions, independent media, community leaders, and inclusive public narratives are strategic assets, rather than soft add-ons. If Canada wants to be serious about defending itself in today’s security environment, resilience must be treated as a core national security function, not an afterthought. Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory